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ABSTRACT
Conceptual engineers seek to revise or replace the devices we use to speak and
think. If this amounts to an effort to change what natural language expressions
mean, conceptual engineers will have a hard time. It is largely unfeasible to
change the meaning of e.g. ‘cause’ in English. Conceptual engineers may
therefore seem unable to make the changes they aim to make. This is what I
call ‘the implementation problem’. In this paper, I argue that the
implementation problem dissolves if we expand our view of how conceptual
engineers could implement the products of their work. I describe four
implementation options: Standing Meaning, Meaning Modulation, Speaker-
Meaning and Different Language. I query the feasibility and worth of pursuing
these options. Unless each option fails because it is unfeasible or not
worthwhile, conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem
worth worrying about. I argue that some of the options are feasible and
worthwhile, and therefore, that conceptual engineers do not face an
implementation problem worth worrying about.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 18 February 2020; Accepted 17 April 2020
KEYWORDS Conceptual engineering; metasemantics; semantic change; speaker-meaning; meaning
modulation; languages
1. Introduction
Conceptual engineers attempt to revise or replace our defective represen-
tational devices. They purport to revise meanings and replace concepts. In
order to do so, they have to be able to affect that which makes it the case
that an expression means what it means, or that which makes it the case
that we think by means of the concepts that we in fact do. To use a term
of art: They have to hook up with the metasemantic functions governing
our thought and talk. If conceptual engineers fail to do so, they will not
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succeed in effecting semantic or conceptual change. To their apparent peril,
it is widely believed that the functions governing our thought and talk
include externalistic functions. Externalistic functions take as input such
matters as what experts believe, what the actual world is like, the natural-
ness of the candidatemeaning and patterns of use that have been initiated
by baptisms long past (Putnam 1975; Burge 1979; Kripke 1980; Lewis 1984;
Sider 2011). Thesematters are largely beyond our control. To makematters
worse, we do not know the details concerning how themetasemantic func-
tions operate, individually or in concert.1 It would seem that the conceptual
engineer is like a blindfolded oarsman, foolishly challenging ocean tides.
Apparently then, metasemantic functions obstruct our efforts at imple-
menting the product of an exercise in conceptual engineering. Let us call
this the implementation problem. Several authors express worries about it.2
In this paper, I focus on linguistic meaning. I argue that the implemen-
tation problem only has bite if we take an unjustifiably restrictive view
of what it is to implement a meaning. On this restrictive view, the only
way to implement a meaning is to change the standing meaning of an
expression in an ordinary language like English. Against this, I direct atten-
tion to the fact that there are multiple ways a conceptual engineer could
implement the meaning she prescribes. I examine the following, possibly
non-exhaustive list of alternatives:
StandingMeaning. She could cause semantic change so that the standingmeaning
of a natural language expression changes to comply with her prescription.
Meaning Modulation. She could get people to modulate the meaning of an
expression in context so that it complies with her prescription.
Speaker-Meaning. She could get people to use an expression with speaker-mean-
ings that comply with her prescription.3
Different Language. She could get people to speak a constructed language in
which a particular expression has the meaning she prescribes.
1Cappelen (2018) makes the stronger claim that metasemantic functions are inscrutable. See Schroeter and
Schroeter (2020) for criticism.
2The implementation problem was first noted with reference to externalist metasemantics by Burgess and
Plunkett (2013a), and Plunkett and Sundell (2013). Cappelen (2018) claims that it constitutes a significant
obstacle and discusses it at length. Deutsch (2020) argues that we cannot stipulate the semantics of
terms. Koch (2018) holds that externalism poses a real hurdle, but argues that we nonetheless have ‘col-
lective long-range control’ over meaning. Riggs (2019) disagrees with these contributions. He argues
that if some metasemantic thesis is true such that we do not have control over what our words
mean, then conceptual engineers did not want to change what our words mean.
3Pinder (2019) argues that we should view conceptual engineers as engaged in the project of changing
speaker-meaning. I agree that with Pinder that it is feasible and worthwhile to change speaker-meaning,
but see no reason to restrict conceptual engineering to this one implementation option.
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Think of the above as options a conceptual engineer could pursue, if she
were to have an intentional plan for implementation. I clarify them later.
We are interested in two properties of these implementation options.
First: Is the option feasible? Are conceptual engineers in a position to do
what the implementation option requires of them? The considerations
given in this introduction suggest that some options, including at least
Standing Meaning, may be unfeasible. Second: Given that the option is
feasible, is it worth pursuing? Does it get conceptual engineers what
they could reasonably desire? Many conceptual engineers want to
promote more exact, precise and fruitful thought and speech. Many
want to promote social justice. If an implementation option rendered
such goals unattainable, the feasibility of that implementation option
would be of little comfort.
To establish that conceptual engineers face an implementation
problem worth worrying about, it is insufficient to show that one of the
above options are unfeasible. In particular, it is not sufficient to show
that it is unfeasible to change the standing meaning of a natural language
expression. Rather, one would have to argue for each of the above options,
that they are unfeasible or that they are not worth pursuing. In the
absence of good reason to dismiss each option, we are justified in
holding that the implementation problem is insignificant; that it is not
truly a problem. One might object to this line of thought if one held
that conceptual engineers’ sole objective is to change the standing
meaning of natural language expressions. However, I argue against this
claim in section 3.
The plan is as follows. In section 2, I briefly describe what conceptual
engineering is. I present an example of a project in conceptual engineer-
ing, identify the prescribed meaning and distinguish ways in which it may
be implemented. In section 3, I discuss Standing Meaning. I explain why it is
largely unfeasible to change standing meaning, but also why we should
ask for other implementation options. In sections 4—6 I discuss, in
order, Meaning Modulation, Speaker-Meaning, and Different Language. I
argue that they constitute feasible and worthwhile options for implement-
ing a meaning.
2. Design and implementation
The main rationale for engaging in conceptual engineering is the conten-
tion that there are devices we could use to speak and think that are
superior to the devices we currently use to speak and think. The devices
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in questionmay be linguistic meanings, such as the meanings of ‘marriage’
and ‘cause’, or concepts, such as a concept of marriage or a concept of cau-
sation.4 To get some purchase on the contention that some meanings and
concepts are better than others are, consider first an example of a concept
designed to be of little use. Consider the concept of an electron or cow, as
opposed to the concept of an electron (cf. Sider 2011, 1–2). It is not by
chance that physicists use the concept of an electron rather than the
concept of an electron or cow. Zoologists are equally prudent to avoid
the latter concept. The union of the set of cows and the set of electrons
does not permit any interesting generalizations for either theorist. For a
different example, consider a concept of marriage that applies exclusively
to couples consisting of one man and one woman. One could organize
social life around this concept, viz. by assigning a range of legal, moral,
practical and symbolic significances to falling in its extension. However,
organizing social life around such a concept of marriage would arguably
breed or constitute discrimination of non-heterosexuals. It is better to
organize social life around a concept of marriage that also applies to
same-sex couples. Such a concept would not engender harm by discrimi-
nation. We could thus argue, on moral grounds, that the inclusive concept
of marriage is a more benign concept of marriage. In general, we can
evaluate concepts as better or worse along various dimensions.5 Concep-
tual engineers attempt to design concepts and meanings that will serve us
well in some capacity.
Conceptual engineers also want to implement the meanings they have
designed. The implementation stage of conceptual engineering is the
topic of this paper. For the purposes of evaluating claims about implemen-
tation, it may be helpful to have an actual example of conceptual engin-
eering in mind. In that errand, let us consider James Woodward’s (2003)
work on causation. Woodward presents his theory of causation as a revi-
sionary account – as an account of what we ought to mean by ‘cause’
and ‘causal explanation’:
4In this paper, I individuate concepts and meanings at a fine granularity (and words at a coarser granu-
larity). This convention has implications for matters of conceptual variation, such as whether your
concept of knowledge is the same as my concept of knowledge, or whether ‘knowledge’ in your idiolect
has the same meaning as ‘knowledge’ in my idiolect. I want to avoid presuming that there is no cross-
individual, cross-cultural or cross-societal conceptual variation where there in fact is such variation (c.f.
Machery 2017). That would require avoiding locutions such as ‘the concept of F’ as if there were one and
only one concept of F. For ease of reading, I sometimes indulge in presuming definiteness, as in ‘the
concept of an electron’.
5See Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, 2013b) for an introduction to conceptual ethics, Ludlow (2014, 41–51)
for criteria guiding modulation of meaning, Cappelen (2018, 34) for a taxonomy of conceptual defects,
Carnap (1962, 1963) for a classical exposition of science-friendly conceptual virtues, and Brun (2016) and
Dutilh Novaes and Reck (2017) for further discussion of Carnapian virtues.
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[M]y project has a significant revisionary or normative component: it makes rec-
ommendations about what one ought to mean by various causal and explana-
tory claims, rather than just attempting to describe how we use those claims.
[…] we introduce concepts (including concepts of cause and explanation) and
characterize them in certain ways at least in part because we want to do
things with them: make certain distinctions, describe certain situations (which
usually requires being able to tell whether the concept applies, on the basis
of evidence that we have some possibility of getting), calculate with them,
use them in proofs or arguments, and so on. Concepts can be well or badly
designed for such purposes and we can evaluate them accordingly. (Woodward
2003, 7–8)
Woodward wrote Making Things Happen before the terms ‘conceptual
engineering’ and ‘conceptual ethics’ were popularized, but his methodo-
logical commitments are squarely within such a framework. To fulfill his
commitments, he constructs multiple concepts of causation and corre-
sponding meanings for ‘cause’. If his project is successful, we can use
these meanings when we want to make more exact, precise and fruitful
causal claims than what we can make with the ordinary meaning of the
word ‘cause’. Woodward engineers four different concepts: of a total
cause, of a direct cause, of a contributing cause and of an actual cause.
Here, I simplify his account and focus only on his concept of a total
cause. Here is how he presents this concept:
(TC) X is a total cause of Y if and only if there is a possible intervention on X that
will change Y or the probability distribution of Y. (Woodward 2003, 51)
Notice that this statement is not explicitly metalinguistic or metaconcep-
tual. It makes no mention of a concept, a meaning or a linguistic
expression. Still, it is clear from how Woodward has framed his project
that (TC) plays the role of presenting a concept or meaning – a concept
or meaning he argues we should use.6 This raises the question: Precisely
which meaning is being presented? For lack of plausible alternatives, we
may identify the meaning as one for ‘total cause’ such that (TC) would
hold true if ‘total cause’ in fact expressed it (never mind whether it actually
does so). Let us call this meaning ‘Woodward’s prescribed meaning’.7
6Notably, (TC) has the same structure as other core theoretical statements in recognized works in concep-
tual engineering, e.g. Haslanger (2000). I do not assume a particular account of this kind of speech act.
One option is to interpret it as part of a metalinguistic negotiation (Plunkett and Sundell 2013; Plunkett
2015). The important distinguishing feature is that the arguments in favor of accepting (TC), as opposed
to a superficially identical statement – e.g. a conceptual analysis or a claim about ‘the nature of’ causa-
tion – have to do with conceptual ethics.
7Strictly speaking, multiple possible meanings for ‘total cause’ could sustain the truth of (TC), given a fine-
grained individuation of meanings (cf. fn. 4). I do not assume that ‘Woodward’s prescribed meaning’
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By assumption, Woodward’s prescribed meaning is non-identical to the
meaning of the English word ‘cause’. Yet it does not require a major depar-
ture from actual semantic fact to imagine ‘cause’ having Woodward’s pre-
scribed meaning. In other words, ‘cause’ could have had a meaning such
that the following sentence would be true:
(TC’) X is a cause of Y if and only if there is a possible intervention on X that will
change Y or the probability distribution of Y.
If Woodward somehow succeeded in changing the standing meaning of
the word ‘cause’ in English, in compliance with his prescription, that
would make it the case that the sentence (TC’) become true in English.
Woodward would then have succeeded in implementing his prescribed
meaning in a particular way: He would have implemented it for ‘cause’,
at the level of standing meaning in English.
It is crucial for my argument that there are other ways of implementing
a meaning, beyond changing the standing meaning of a particular word in
a particular language, such as changing the standing meaning of the word
‘cause’ in English. However, once we grasp the identity of the meaning in
question, it is readily conceivable how it could be implemented in other
ways. The very same meaning we identified above could
(1) be the meaning of ‘cause’ on an occasion of use,
(2) be a component of a content communicated by a speaker, by means
of the word ‘cause’, or
(3) be the meaning of the word ‘cause’ in a different language than ordin-
ary English.
Here, (1) – (3) correspond to the implementation options I sketched in
the introduction, i.e. Meaning Modulation, Speaker-Meaning and Different
Language, respectively. I argue in later sections that some or all of these
implementation options are not only conceivable, but also feasible and
worth pursuing.
Note finally that is not necessary to target ‘cause’ as the word for which
to implement Woodward’s prescribed meaning. Woodward himself uses a
different lexical item in his actual theoretical statement (‘total cause’). My
reason for focusing on ‘cause’ as the vehicle for Woodward’s prescribed
meaning has to do with the idea that it is metasemantically more
picks out a single, unique meaning at the finest level of granularity, but rather a range of meanings so
individuated.
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problematic to implement a meaning by way of a pre-existing lexical item
(lexical improvement) than by way of a novel expression (lexical expansion).
A pre-existing lexical item has a history of use and a novel expression does
not. If we should not worry about the implementation problem with
respect to cases of lexical improvement, there is inter alia no reason to
worry about the implementation problem with respect to cases of
lexical expansion. It is no less worth noting that the lexically expansive
variety of conceptual engineering may be both feasible and worthwhile
on independent terms.8
I now turn to examine our implementation options. In the next section, I
discuss Standing Meaning.
3. Standing meaning
On an innocuous description, conceptual engineers purport to revise what
words mean. This description suggests that conceptual engineers try to
change the standing meaning of natural language expressions. For
example, Woodward would be in the business of trying to change the
meaning of the word ‘cause’ in English. His efforts would be futile: It is
unfeasible to change the meaning of ‘cause’ in English. The unfeasibility
of changing the standing meaning of expressions in languages like
English has impelled Cappelen (2018), Deutsch (2020) and, albeit less so,
Koch (2018) to hold that conceptual engineers face an implementation
problem worth worrying about.
My main argument in this paper is that we have no reason to worry
about the implementation problem once we expand our view to other
implementation options. I discuss feasible options in later sections. In
this section, I examine Standing Meaning in closer detail. First, I elaborate
on why we should think that it is largely unfeasible to change standing
meaning. Second, I show that the unfeasibility of changing standing
meaning is a language-specific feature. We may not be able to change
what words mean in English, but we need to consider other languages.
In particular, we need to consider idiolects and other small languages.
Neither Cappelen (2018), Koch (2018) nor Deutsch (2020) assess particular
languages for the feasibility of effecting semantic change in them.
However, just as we should take into more serious consideration other
meaning-phenomena than standing meaning (and corresponding
8The distinction maps on to what Chalmers has called de novo engineering and conceptual re-engineering
(Chalmers 2018). For further discussion of lexical expansion vs. lexical shift/improvement, see Armstrong
(2016) and Cappelen (2020).
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implementation options), we should consider the feasibility of changing
standing meaning across languages. Finally, I argue that we should not
restrict conceptual engineering to the project of trying to change standing
meaning.
To appreciate why it is largely unfeasible to change standing meaning,
consider a word whose semantics has earned much theoretical attention:
‘water’. It is a semantic fact that ‘water’ denotes stuff composed of H2O-
molecules. This would hold true even if many, perhaps most, English-
speakers lacked knowledge of the chemical composition of water. But
why does ‘water’ denote H2O-composed stuff? Which facts ground this
fact? The following facts have all been adduced to explain why ‘water’
denotes H2O-composed stuff:
. H2O-molecules compose the stuff that comes out of our taps and fills
our lakes.
. Chemists believe that water is H2O.
. Our use of ‘water’ stands in a complex causal relation to stuff composed
of H2O-molecules.
. Stuff composed of H2O-molecules is a more natural referent for ‘water’
than are alternative candidates.
. Facts about (complex) patterns in the use of ‘water’, including how it
was introduced.
I draw these explanantia from celebrated proposals in the externalist
tradition, including Putnam (1975), Lewis (1984), Kripke (1980), Burge
(1979) and Devitt (1984). We may ignore the differences between the
views. The interesting feature is common to them: The listed metaseman-
tic determinants are largely beyond our control.
There must also be metasemantic determinants within our control.
H2O-composed stuff is not, as such, a more natural meaning candidate
than NaCl-composed stuff, so naturalness cannot by itself select the
former for ‘water’ and the latter for ‘table salt’. Similarly, the fact that
H2O-composed stuff comes out of our taps cannot singlehandedly make
the word ‘water’ denote the stuff so identified. The fact that ‘water’
denotes H2O-composed stuff must have something to do with how
English-speakers use and have used that word. Indeed, I mentioned
facts about complex patterns in the use of ‘water’ in the previous para-
graph, but claimed that they were largely beyond our control. Surely,
however, the right thing to say is that such patterns are beyond our indi-
vidual control, not beyond our collective control. As a collective, we could
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start using a word differently, and this may provide leeway to effect
semantic change. Steffen Koch (2018) has argued that we have ‘collective
long-range control’ over meaning on roughly these grounds. He likens the
control we have over meaning to the control we have over the climate,
and concludes with ‘modest optimism’ about the prospects conceptual
engineers face. The idea is that a conceptual engineer could succeed in
effecting semantic change if she could cause a significant portion of the
linguistic population to start using a target expression differently, viz. in
accordance with her prescription. It is clearly possible to change the
way people use words, hence the modest optimism.
However, our modicum of optimism should vaporize when we take a
moment to consider just how many speakers one would have to
influence in order to cause a change in the standing meaning of ‘water’
or ‘cause’ in this way. While it is not metaphysically impossible to
change the meaning of ‘water’ or ‘cause’, it is beyond what we may
count as practically feasible.9 The same would hold true for most
expressions of most ordinary languages. This result should not come as
a surprise. The very idea of standing meaning – of the meaning a word
has in a language; its lexical meaning – is about something stable across
speakers, times and places. It cannot be an easily manipulable commodity.
Thus, the problem is not so much that there are externalistic determinants
of meaning. The standing meaning of a word could be determined exclu-
sively by internalistic factors – such as what the speakers of a language
intend or mean by a word – and yet it would be unfeasible to change
because it were practically impossible to change sufficiently many inten-
tional states. Arguably, it is within our power to change some of the rel-
evant intentional states. One could e.g. give convincing arguments for
what we should mean by a word. But in languages like English there are
just too many individuals one would have to affect. Whether we
endorse some form of externalism or some form of internalism, then,
the standing meaning of expressions in languages like English will be
beyond our control.
The reference to English is non-accidental. When assessing the (un)fea-
sibility of changing the standing meaning of natural language expressions,
we need to keep in mind that expressions only have meaning in virtue of
9Neither Cappelen (2018) nor Deutsch (2020) assume that it is metaphysically impossible to change
meaning, so my assuming that is metaphysically possible to change meaning does not beg the question
against their views. Clearly, there are metasemantic views (in the vast space of logically possible views)
on which any given semantic fact depends exclusively upon facts that are utterly beyond human control.
I do not address such views.
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belonging to a particular language. There is no such thing as the semantic
value of a sound or inscription unless we conceive of the sound or inscrip-
tion as a particular expression in a particular language. This much is
evident when we consider the sound we make when we pronounce
‘see’. The sound means different things in English ([≈view] or [sea]),
Spanish (‘sí’ [yes]) and Norwegian (‘si’ [say]), and it means nothing in e.g.
Finnish or Arabic. This point can get lost on us when we are inquiring
into what kind of metasemantic determinants natural languages are
subject to in general, but the identity of the language matters in the
present context. It matters because we cannot infer that it is unfeasible
to change the standing meaning of natural language expressions from
the fact that it is unfeasible to change the standing meaning of English
expressions. In particular, we should assess smaller languages.
Let us therefore consider an opposite extreme of English with respect to
size: The language used by two people, Tim and Martha, to communicate
with each other. Tim and Martha have frequent discussions about all sorts
of philosophical and non-philosophical issues. With other people, they
speak plain English, but when they are discussing with each other they
often find reason to use expressions that are not part of ordinary
English, or to use English expressions differently. An empirical linguist
could therefore investigate the language they use to communicate with
each other as a language in its own right. Now, suppose Tim and
Martha dislike the intension of ‘water’ in English (according to the seman-
tics we are taught about that word). Tim says, ‘Let’s start speaking as if
“water” denotes anything that has the sensory and practical properties
of the stuff that comes out of our taps, but could vary in chemical compo-
sition’. Martha replies ‘Brilliant, let’s go’.
First, it is clear that they could, between the two of them, go on to use
words in accordance with their agreement, thereby doing everything in
their power to institute the wanted meaning in the (two-speaker)
language they use to communicate with each other. Second, we need a
good reason to believe that, once they have, other metasemantic determi-
nants will counteract. According to one strand of externalism, compara-
tively natural meaning candidates exert a kind magnetism, so that terms
come to denote them rather than alternative, unnatural meaning candi-
dates (Lewis 1984; Sider 2011). But surely, H2O’s alleged reference magnet-
ism would not override the conventions Tim and Martha abide by. On
Lewisian metasemantics at least, reference magnetism only kicks in after
the conventions of language use have determined a range of initially
admissible interpretations (Williams 2007). The conventions Tim and
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Martha comply with do not permit us to assign H2O-composed stuff as the
exclusive denotation of ‘water’. After all, they use ‘water’ to talk about logi-
cally possible stuff that is not composed by H2O. What about the meaning-
grounding fact, identified by Putnam, that what we call ‘water’ in the
actual world is composed by H2O? It is implausible that this would obstruct
their efforts. Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment purports to show
that psychologically identical individuals could mean different things by
‘water’ if their environments were different (Putnam 1975). The converse
does not follow: Sameness of environment does not ensure that ‘water’
means the same thing for psychologically distinct individuals. Putnam
never argued that our H2O-laden environment would make ‘water’ refer
to H2O in any idiolect, no matter the beliefs, intentions and use-patterns
of the speakers. Indeed, that would be an implausible claim. I project
that Putnam’s argument would not convince many readers if the speakers
transported to Twin Earth were Tim and Martha, as I have described them
here. Tim and Martha seem to succeed in speaking a language in which
‘water’ denotes stuff not necessarily composed by H2O.
It might help clarify this discussion to note that it does not follow that it
is unfeasible to change meaning property M from the hypothesis that
there are metasemantic determinants of M beyond our control, such as
naturalness or past usage. As long as there also are metasemantic deter-
minants of M we can control, then, provided that it is sufficient to
change these to change M, it is feasible to change M. Thus, Deutsch is mis-
taken when he writes ‘[E]xternalism does imply that semantic shifts require
corresponding shifts in external factors: stipulation, by itself, never
suffices’. (Deutsch 2020). It may be that a speaker’s intention or act of sti-
pulation does not suffice for a change in meaning in a given case. On the
other hand, semantic change does not necessarily require change in exter-
nal factors, even on strongly externalist views. Externalism is the denial of
internalism, not the claim that external factors exhaustively determine
meaning. I am unfamiliar with any externalist account committed to the
excessively strong claim that intentional states play no role in determining
meaning, and see no need to address such a view.
If Tim and Martha would succeed in the changing the language they
use to communicate with each other, the implementation problem does
not affect very small languages. Since it seems that they would succeed,
there seem to be languages for which it is feasible to change standing
meaning. On the other hand, it still seems unfeasible to change what
words mean in English. We therefore find that it is unfeasible to change
the standing meaning of expressions in some but not all languages. The
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feasibility of changing standing meaning depends importantly, though
not solely, upon the number of individuals that speak the language one
is trying to effect semantic change in. In fact, if use-patterns and
speaker intentions play any role in determining standing meaning, then,
notwithstanding the operation of other metasemantic mechanisms, it will
be more feasible to change the standing meaning of expressions the
smaller the language is.10
We could also use ordinary, coarsely individuated languages to illustrate
the language-relative feasibility of changing standing meaning. Consider
Lule Sámi, a language spoken by 1,000—2,000 people in northern
Sweden and Norway. Clearly, if use-patterns or speaker intentions play
any role in determining meaning, then it is more feasible to change
what a Lule Sámi expression means than it is to change what an English
expression means. If a conceptual engineer changes how 1,000 speakers
use a Lule Sámi expression, she would be making reasonable progress
towards semantic change. If a conceptual engineer changes how 1,000
speakers use an English expression, she would barely be getting started.
It is therefore more feasible to change the semantics of Lule Sámi than
to change the semantics of English, much like it is more feasible to
climb Mont Blanc than it is to climb Mount Everest.
This leads to a strange consequence for those committed to the claim
that conceptual engineers only succeed in implementing the product of
their work if they succeed in changing the standing meaning of an ordin-
ary language expression. They are forced to hold that conceptual engin-
eering is more feasible, hence easier, in small languages than in big
languages. Though perhaps not absurd, this is a strange consequence
for the view, and it needs to be squared with the significance one
accords to succeeding in conceptual engineering.11 Instead of looking
for reason to maintain this view, I propose we widen our view of the
implementation options conceptual engineers could pursue.
This reasoning may be further substantiated. Notably, failure to effect
semantic change in an ordinary language does not entail failure to
effect semantic change in any language spoken among the same popu-
lation. To illustrate what I have in mind, suppose Woodward manages to
get a set of people S to use the word ‘cause’ in accordance with his
10A minor qualification: If e.g. past or expert usage play important metasemantic roles, then the target
languages may need to be alike in other regards, but all things considered, size still matters.
11On Cappelen’s (2018, 137–147) ascription of worldly significance e.g. changing what ‘cause’ means is to
change in what it is to be a cause. Arguably, however, it is not easier to change what it is for things to be
what they are by working in Lule Sámi than in English.
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prescription. For practically realistic membership assignments to S, he
would fail change the standing meaning of ‘cause’ in English. But there
may be other languages he could succeed in effecting semantic change
in, depending upon the exact members of S. Failing to effect semantic
change in English, he could still have caused semantic change in American
English12, the language spoken by American scientists, the language
spoken by experimental scientists at the University of Pittsburgh, or…
Restrictions on language individuation limit how long this list can go on,
but those restrictions are not entirely clear, if, indeed, there are any hard
restrictions. It is equally well worth considering counterfactual circum-
stances where English has fewer speakers. In some of these, the
changes in behavior among S-members would constitute semantic
change in English, despite not constituting semantic change in English
in the actual world. While it may be that our counterfactual Woodward
would succeed in something that our actual Woodward would not – viz.
changing the meaning of ‘cause’ in English – it seems clear that the
actual Woodward has also had a significant impact on speech and
thought, never mind his failure to change the meaning of ‘cause’ in
English. I suggest we attend to implementation options that can articulate
the kind of success he has, irrespective of his causing semantic change in
any given language.
Changes in standing meaning are metaphysically downstream from the
changes in speaker behavior and speaker intention that conceptual engin-
eers can in the first instance hope to make. Indeed, they are quite far
downstream, in the sense that they are harder to effect than other
changes in speech and thought. I propose we rather identify success con-
ditions that can articulate the changes conceptual engineers have a
chance at accomplishing. The implementation options described in pro-
ceeding sections do just that. As long as these other options leave concep-
tual engineering worthwhile doing, there is poor reason to restrict
conceptual engineering to the project of trying to effect semantic
change in ordinary languages. In this light, the standing meaning of
expressions in ordinary languages is a rather arbitrary locus of change.
Moreover, it is uncharitable to view conceptual engineers as engaged in
largely futile projects, when we could view them as engaged in fruitful pro-
jects. Therefore, even though it may be feasible to change the standing
meaning of expressions in some languages – small languages being the
12The main differences between British and American English are in spelling and phonetics, but semantic
differences are not unheard of. For example, in its standard usage in the respective languages, ‘corn’
refers solely to maize in American English, but any cereal grain in British English.
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most probable – there seems to be poor reason to hold on to Standing
Meaning as the only implementation option.
4. Meaning modulation
We have found that it is largely unfeasible to change the standing
meaning of natural language expressions – at least in most ordinary, coar-
sely individuated languages. For the sake of argument, we can now
assume that there are no natural languages for which it is feasible to
change standing meaning. It would not follow that speakers are unable
to change the semantic values of expressions in context. And if that
were the case, conceptual engineers could convince them to change
them in particular ways. In this section, I discuss Peter Ludlow’s view of
meaning modulation, and Herman Cappelen’s objection to the thesis of
meaning control it relies upon (Ludlow 2014; Cappelen 2018).13
According to Ludlow (2014), analytic philosophers have too often
assumed that natural languages have static lexicons with fully determinate
meanings. He presents an extensive battery of examples to show, first, that
meanings are more dynamic than commonly thought, and second, that
meanings are generally underdetermined. The examples range from
‘book’, ‘hacktivist’, ‘journalist’, ‘doll’ and ‘planet’, to ‘rape’ and ‘person’. Con-
spicuously, Ludlow provides evidence that we change the meanings of
such expressions on a conversation-by-conversation basis, often intention-
ally and often by argument. He enlists a couple of technical terms to
describe this: When speakers engage in narrowing, broadening, sharpen-
ing or loosening the meaning of an expression, reflectively or not, then, if
the hearer accepts, they havemodulated that meaning. The result of mod-
ulating one or more meanings is that the interlocutors are speaking a
microlanguage, in which the affected expressions have the meanings so
modulated.
Ludlow’s view of language in Living Words (2014) is one of constant flux.
However, his focus on demonstrating the ubiquity of meaning modulation
comes at a cost: We lose sight of the continuity of meaning and language
use, about which Ludlow writes close to nothing.14 But presumably, there
13To represent Ludlow’s view fairly, note that he avoids talk of the semantic values of expressions, in favor
of talk of meanings and modulations thereof. He intends to remain as neutral as possible towards ways
of thinking about the semantics-pragmatics interface (Ludlow 2014, 96).
14Here is an exception: ‘When we engage with others in conversation, all of the participants come to the
table with a robust linguistic background already in place. We could say that the words the participants
are deploying have residual value from previous entrainments’. (Ludlow 2014, 39–40). ‘Entrainment’
refers to the outcome of coordinating meaning with conversational partners.
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must be something like the standing meaning of an expression, no matter
how underdetermined and subject-to-long-term-change it may be. If there
were not, we would have a hard time explaining successful communi-
cation in impoverished contexts, e.g. with remote strangers (c.f. Cappelen
2018, 164–165). In addition, it is reasonable to think that the very possi-
bility of modulating meanings requires the existence of some stable
meaning that interlocutors then go on to mold in accordance with their
needs, interests and values. Thus, while it might be the case that ordinary
languages depend upon patterns of local use, there is surely dependency
the other way around too. Acknowledging this is important for the reason
that it gives externalistic determinants of meaning a stronger and perhaps
more plausible role than what they have on Ludlow’s view. We see this in
the following.
Ludlow specifically addresses the compatibility of his view of meaning
with externalism:
The doctrine of Meaning Control says that we (and our conversational partners)
in principle have control over what our words mean. The meanings are not fixed
by convention, nor by our conversational setting alone. If our conversational
partners are willing to go with us, we can modulate meanings as we see fit.
[…] Meaning Control does not exclude the possibility of externalism about
content […] The idea is that it is within our control to defer to others on
elements of the meaning of our words (for example, a doctor on the meaning
of ‘arthritis’ and a botanist on the referents of ‘beech’ and ‘elm’) and it is also
within our control to be receptive to discoveries about the underlying physical
structure of the things we refer to (for example, the discovery that ‘water’ refers
to H2O and not XYZ). (Ludlow 2014, 83)
Some externalistic features of meaning may be accommodated on the
strength of this appeal to deference. However, certain externalists may
be displeased with the idea that speakers do not use externalistic mean-
ings until they choose to defer to experts or be receptive to discoveries.
Cappelen gives voice to this concern:
Externalism as I have understood it—and as it has been understood in the phi-
losophical tradition that springs out of the work of Kripke, Burge, and Putnam—
is not the view that conversational partners at any one point in time can just
decide that externalistic constraints on semantics don’t apply. (Cappelen 2018,
166–167)
Ludlow would have had a plausible reply if he had allowed something like
the standing meaning of an expression. He could then reply that speakers
cannot simply change the standing meaning of an expression by opting
out of externalism. Standing meaning could remain constrained by e.g.
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broad patterns of use long pre-dating the conversations in question, and
hence held constant. If the standing meaning of an expression is that
meaning speakers use by default, this gives externalistic determinants a
strong and plausible a role to play. It would still leave room for speakers
to use deviant meanings locally, when they make active choices to modu-
late meanings (or choose to speak in ways that modulate meanings by
consequence).
Pace Cappelen, I am unsure of the exact shape of the externalist theses
that spring out of the work of Kripke, Burge and Putnam. Are facts about
meaning in context supposed to be grounded the exact same way as
facts about standing meaning, or are the former manipulable in a way
that the latter are not? How much context-sensitivity is there? Cappelen’s
objection to Ludlow seems to rest more on an anti-contextualist view
than on externalism per se. Here, anti-contextualism is the thesis that the
semantic values of uses of language are fixed with no pragmatic intrusion:
The only role for context is to fill in the gaps left open by a restricted set
of context-sensitive expressions – e.g. indexicals like ‘I’ and ‘now’ – not to
change what terms like ‘marriage’ or ‘cause’ denote (cf. King and Stanley
2005; Recanati 2010). One may, or may not, embrace a form of externalism
that embodies anti-contextualism. If an anti-contextualist version of extern-
alism holds true, it is unfeasible to change the semantic values of
expressions in context through agreement between conversational part-
ners. In that case, conceptual engineers could still influence people to
adopt speaker-meanings that align with their prescription, as described in
the next section. Meanwhile, there is clearly logical space for a view in the
externalist family that would leave contextual meaning within the control
of conversational partners. If such a Ludlow-friendly externalism holds
true, speakers could modulate meanings in context. And then, if a concep-
tual engineer could get people to modulate meanings in accordance with
their work, I submit that she would accomplish what she could reasonably
desire to accomplish. IfWoodward couldgetnpeople tomodulate ‘cause’ in
accordance with his prescription on x occasions, I see no reason for him to
feel that there is something left to be accomplished; someway that he could
further implement his prescribed meaning for those n people on those x
occasions of use. His efforts would be worthwhile.
6. Speaker-meaning
Now suppose that an anti-contextualist version of externalism holds true.
On this externalism, there is no leeway to change the meaning of
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expressions in context by conversational agreement. Things being so, con-
ceptual engineers could still aim to affect what speakers communicate or
what they attempt to communicate. In other words, conceptual engineers
could attempt to affect the speaker-meanings that we could assign to the
expressions people use in context.15
It takes no more than traditional Gricean pragmatics to show that what
we communicate, implicate or intend to communicate, may be non-iden-
tical to what is said by an utterance, in a pure, semantic sense of ‘said’
(Grice 1989). Therefore, speaker-meanings cannot be fixed by the very
same facts and functions that determine the standing meaning of the
expressions used. Moreover, the abundance of examples in the pragmatics
literature suggests that there are no clear limits to what we can commu-
nicate by means of an expression. Famously, we can use ‘ham sandwich’
to refer to a person (as in ‘The ham sandwich left without paying’.
where a waiter is referring to a person who ordered a ham sandwich).
On these grounds, it should be feasible to use ‘cause’ to communicate
one of the meanings Woodward has designed for that word.
One might worry that it is one thing to intend to communicate such a
content, quite another to succeed in communicating it. Conceptual engin-
eering would not be worthwhile if its practitioners could only initiate futile
efforts at communication. Thus, one may object that I have merely substi-
tuted one problem for another. But the exchange is favorable: We have
traded an intractable metaphysical problem for a feasible practical chal-
lenge. Granted, it may be difficult to communicate what one means
when one is using an existing expression with a deviant meaning (or
what one means by a novel expression, for that matter). However, by no
means is it impossible. We can always say what we mean. For example, I
can say that I am using the word ‘cause’ with the meaning Woodward
has designed for ‘total cause’; I can say that I am using ‘cause’ in such a
way that x is a cause of y if and only if… I can say that I am using ‘marriage’
such that same-sex couples may be married. All the materials for commu-
nicating clearly what one means by an expression should already be in
place if one is attempting to communicate what a conceptual engineer
has argued that we should mean by that expression. If those materials
15Pinder (2019) argues that we should view conceptual engineers as engaged in changing speaker-
meaning, chiefly because it presents a more plausible interpretation of the practice than what we
get if we view conceptual engineers as trying (and failing) to bring about semantic change. Pinder’s
arguments are different but compatible with the present defense of the option to change speaker-
meaning.
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are not in place, the design-stage of that piece of conceptual engineering
has not been successful, but that is a separate issue.
Changing what speakers communicate by their use of an expression
does not involve changing any semantic fact as such. Since this implemen-
tation option does not guarantee any semantic change, locally or globally,
one may question whether it gets conceptual engineers what they want.
Does not the success of a project in conceptual engineering require that
one has changed a semantic fact at some level or another? Deutsch
writes that
a conceptual engineer might convince some speakers to speaker-refer to some-
thing other than the semantic reference of ‘free action’when using the term. But
this seems like a rather trivial and easy thing to do. Surely it is not the sort of
thing the exciting terminology of ‘conceptual engineering’ was designed to
describe. (Deutsch 2020)
Deutsch leaves his claim about triviality unexplained. The claim cannot,
however, provide grounds to conclude that it is not worthwhile to
change speaker-meaning. The only sense in which it is trivial to change
speaker-meaning is that there is no implementation problem inhibiting
it as there is for the project of changing standing meaning. Moreover, I
see no reason why ‘the exciting terminology of “conceptual engineering”’
should entail that implementing a meaning cannot be trivial, in this sense
of ‘trivial’. To be sure, it would not follow that changes in speaker-meaning
are inconsequential. It is question-begging to assume that conceptual
engineers have to face an implementation problem to be engaged in a
worthwhile project.
More importantly, there are independent reasons to value speaker-
meaning as a locus of change. To see this, consider the converse situation
of changing the semantic facts without changing what speakers commu-
nicate. The downstream effects of speech on belief and action depend
upon what is communicated, not on what is semantically encoded by
an utterance (in case what is semantically encoded is not what is commu-
nicated). This means that philosophers who want to promote social justice
by engaging in conceptual engineering, such as Haslanger (2012), would
be very unhappy with this predicament. She could then succeed in
effecting semantic change without doing one bit for the cause. By chan-
ging communication facts without changing semantic facts, on the
other hand, she would be able to make relevant changes: changes that
could constitute the promotion of social justice. The same goes for pro-
jects aiming for better inquiry, scientific or non-scientific. If Woodward
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could get scientists to communicate by ‘cause’ what he argues we should
mean by that word, without changing any semantic fact about it, it would
still result in scientists reaching conclusions that are logically licensed by
the inferential role he has designed. Moreover, insofar as Woodward has
succeeded in designing an exact and fruitful meaning for ‘cause’, beliefs
instilled by communicating that exact and fruitful meaning would them-
selves be exact and fruitful. These are worthwhile changes. It is therefore
worthwhile to change speaker-meaning.
The worth and feasibility of changing speaker-meaning would not
count for much if you could only cause a severely limited amount of speak-
ers adopt the meaning you prescribe. However, there are only familiar,
practical limitations on how many people you can convince, and how
often they will end up meaning by an expression what you argue they
should mean by it. Therefore, this implementation option leaves concep-
tual engineers in a no worse predicament than those who engage in the
familiar project of trying to change what people believe.
Objection: According to Cappelen, ‘The content of what’s called “speak-
er’s meaning” is just as externalistically determined as linguistic meaning:
we have nomore control over that content than we have over what we say
when we utter sentences in a public language’. (Cappelen 2018, 76).
Reply: This is an unattractive view. The existenceof non-identity between
an expression’s linguistic meaning and what a speaker means by it entails
that the former cannot be fixed by the very same determinants and func-
tions that fix the latter. But then, if it is true that speaker-meaning is just
as externalistically determined as linguistic meaning, we need to tell two
separate externalist stories, one for speaker-meaning and one for linguistic
meaning, and the former story has to leave speaker-meaning beyond our
control. The only remotely plausible way of constructing that story – that
I can think of, anyway – is to recognize that what a speaker means is a
content she entertains in thought, and then to see externalism about
speaker-meaning as a special case of externalism about thought content.
This might seem like a reasonable approach. The problem, however, is
how an externalism about thought content can deliver as strong results as
is needed in this context. Suppose I want to go along with Tim and Martha
and speak about all and only the stuff that share the sensory and practical
properties possessed by what we call ‘water’ here on Earth, including stuff
that is not composed by H2O. I seem to be able to entertain thoughts
about this stuff. I can simply think about it in the above terms. If that is
the case, then these thoughts are available to me when I want to commu-
nicate something by means of a word, including the word ‘water’. As
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always, I just have to make my communicative intentions known. Surely,
the externalist about thought content will urge that we cannot typify
the thoughts in question as thoughts about water, since water-thoughts
are essentially about H2O-composed stuff. However, there is no need to
typify them as water-thoughts. No matter how we typify them, they are
still available to provide a content for what I want to communicate by
means of an arbitrary expression (including ‘water’). For these reasons, I
am not optimistic on behalf of the claim that speaker-meaning is
beyond our control in the relevant way.
7. Speak a different language
We have so far considered how conceptual engineers could implement
their prescribed meanings in (or through the use of) existing languages.
However, they could also implement their prescribed meanings by way
of constructing new languages. In section 3, we found that the standing
meaning of natural language expressions are largely beyond our control,
such as ‘cause’ or ‘water’ in English. For the sake of argument, we can
now assume that not even tiny languages constitute an exception.
Perhaps because, contrary to my own belief, naturalness or past usage
play a much stronger role that I have given them credit for. On this
basis, one may worry that any language is such that the meanings of its
expressions are beyond our control.
However, it is just not true that all languages are subject to externalistic
determinants. Artificial languages comprise a significant exception. Con-
sider programing languages. The rules that constitute a programing
language alone determine the semantic values that syntactically valid
strings attain. Those values need not conform to what experts believe
(whatever that means), what would be the most ‘natural’ value, and
they are not affected by any causal interaction between language users
and the environment. Similarly, when we use the language of classical
logic (or the language of an alternative logic), the rules governing that
language alone determine the meaning of the symbols used. Program-
mers and logicians have defined the rules for such languages. Their acts
of defining rules were in their control, insofar as anything is ever in our
control. Hence, the metasemantic determinants for such languages are
in our control. By consequence, so are the meanings of the expressions
in such languages. It is in our power to construct languages. When we
do, the meanings of the expressions in the target language seem to be
in our firm control.
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Therefore, even if externalist metasemantics inhibit conceptual engin-
eers from changing the languages we already have in use, and even if
externalist metasemantics inhibit them from getting speakers to commu-
nicate deviant meanings through their use of an existing language, con-
ceptual engineers could still construct new languages. Indeed, if we
individuate languages semantically – i.e. that language L ≠ language L*
if L and L* encode different mappings from lexical items to semantic
values – it is hard not to see conceptual engineers as proposing that we
speak different languages than the languages that are currently in use.
It would be practically unfeasible to construct languages from scratch if
this requires us to provide rules that would make it the case that an
expression in the constructed language has an identical meaning to,
say, the one we saw Woodward design for ‘cause’. That meaning was
designed with the help of English expressions, and it would take an incon-
ceivable amount of work to recreate the meanings of the latter
expressions in a language built up from scratch (if it is at all possible).
This may breed suspicion that it is not possible for conceptual engineers
to construct the meanings they are interested in by way of constructing
new languages.
However, conceptual engineers do not have to construct languages
from scratch. They can instead propose that we speak a language L*,
that has the same morphology, phonetics, syntax and semantics as an
existing natural language L, except for the imposition of a semantic rule
and concomitant adjustments. In that way, it is practically feasible to con-
struct L*. Imagine Woodward propose that we speak English* rather than
English, where English* inherits meaning for all its expressions from
English, except for the meanings that ‘cause’ and its cognates have,
which are instead defined by the rules he puts forward in his work, and
cognate supplements. This is certainly something Woodward could have
proposed. If people follow up on his proposal and start speaking
English*, well, then he will have succeeded in getting people to use the
meaning he prescribes. So long as the usual effects of speech obtain in
the event of speaking English* (rather than English), it would be a worth-
while accomplishment. I see no reason why those effects would not
obtain. Getting people to speak a different language therefore seems
like a viable option to grant conceptual engineers what they could reason-
ably desire. In the following, I respond to three potential objections to this
implementation option.
First, it will do no good to object that we do not grasp what it is to speak
English*. Our grasp of what it is to speak English* is at least as good as our
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grasp of what it is to speak English. Speaking English*, after all, just is
speaking English except for the substitution of a meaning we have
found it hard to pin down in precise terms, for a meaning that has been
given by precise, bi-conditional statements.
Second, one may worry that speakers of English* would not be able to
communicate with speakers of English. However, it is not in general true
that we are incapable of communicating across languages. Consider
Spanish and Portuguese, or Swedish and Norwegian. Admittedly, our
case is different: It involves semantic variation, rather than variation in pho-
netics or spelling. Therefore, in order to communicate properly, the
speaker has to let the hearer know of her semantic deviance. If a
speaker of English* hides the fact that she is speaking a language in
which ‘cause’ has a different meaning from the homonym in English, or
fails to take other steps to ensure that the intended content is retrieved,
she will not meet the demands for good communication. I offer no safe-
guards against bad communication. Clearly, however, there are straight-
forward ways of communicating well, such as saying what you mean.
Conceptual engineering is, if anything, an excellent tool for getting clear
on exactly what we mean, and hence to avoid verbal disputes and other
miscommunications. In addition, conceptual engineers are concerned to
minimize or eliminate properties of meaning that make us liable to com-
municate badly, such as vagueness or imprecision. Since the present
implementation option requires being precise about the semantic features
of the language one is speaking, it does not undercut this virtue of concep-
tual engineering.
Third, one may worry that I am relying on an individuation criterion for
languages that is too fine-grained. Would speakers of English* really be
speaking a different language from English? Well, this obviously
depends on how we individuate languages. On a coarse-grained indivi-
duation, use of English* will just be use of English.16 But we can still
single out English* if need be. Compare with Lewis on the languages
spoken in a population P:
Not one but many—perhaps infinitely many—languages are used by P. […] That
is so, but it is no problem. Why not say that any rich fragment of a language used
16C.f. Davidson:
There is much to be said for restricting the word ‘language’ to systems of signs that are or have
been in actual use: uninterpreted formal systems are not languages through lack of meaning,
while interpreted formal systems are best seen as extensions or fragments of the natural languages
from which they borrow life. (Davidson 2001/1973, 71, emphasis added).
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by P is itself a used language? Indeed, we will need to say such things when P is
linguistically inhomogeneous. (Lewis 1983/1975, 186)
If it is in our interest to be precise, we can identify different fine-grained
languages spoken among speakers of English. There is the language of
politicians, the language of theoretical physics, the language of jihadists,
the language of ‘counter-jihadists’, the language of drug dealers etc. In
practice, we rarely need to descend to a very fine-grained level of indivi-
duation, but that is a poor reason to prohibit fine-grained language indi-
viduation in our theorizing. How we individuate languages is and ought
to be driven by our (passing) interests. Sometimes, the small differences
matter. This is not unique to languages. We employ different individuation
criteria for many, if not most, other objects, abstract and concrete. For
example, different passing interests guide whether we count book a
and book b as the same book: Same copy? Same string of marks? Same
informational content? Either we individuate languages finely, and allow
the possibility described in this section, or we individuate them coarsely.
If we do individuate them coarsely, then, on pain of putting the cart
before the horse, we have to adjust our metasemantic theses for the
languages so individuated. Our choice of an individuation criterion for
languages cannot carry the metaphysical weight that this worry asks of it.
It is important not to confuse the preceding discussion with questions
about the primacy of idiolects or momentary rules of interpretation on
the one hand, and large, ordinary languages on the other (e.g. as discussed
by Davidson 1986 and Dummett 1986). It is a matter of contention whether
English is to be explained as a complex amalgamation of idiolects, or, con-
versely, whether there must be a larger social practice in place before there
canbe any linguisticmeaning. Theprecedingdiscussiondoes not avail itself
of the independent existence of idiolects: On this proposal, the conceptual
engineer is using a large, ordinary language to construct whatwemight call
an idiolect or a constructed language. The large, ordinary language must
therefore be in place to develop the constructed language. In the paradigm
case, the conceptual engineer is producing a sentence – such as Wood-
ward’s (TC’) – that is false or indeterminate in the large, social language,
but true in the constructed language. The conceptual engineer, on this con-
strual, is proposing that we speak a language in which the sentence is true.
Given that we can choose which language to speak, this is a feasible
way of implementing a meaning. Conceptual engineers could succeed
in implementing a meaning by convincing people to speak the language
they prescribe.
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9. Conclusion
It may be largely unfeasible to change standing meaning in the natural
languages we ordinarily recognize (e.g. English and Spanish). However,
we have found reason to reject the claim that conceptual engineers
must do so or else accomplish nothing. In the last three sections, we
have considered other ways in which conceptual engineers could
succeed in implementing the products of their work; other options for
getting people to use the meanings they prescribe. The options are not
intended to be mutually exclusive, and it is not my belief that conceptual
engineers have to commit to the one or the other. Rather, the options I
have identified are tailored to address a variety of theoretical views on
language and thought, with the aim of showing that conceptual engineers
should not worry about the implementation problem. Without additional,
controversial assumptions, none of the implementation options are ren-
dered unfeasible by metasemantic externalism. The feasibility of the
modulation option could be defeated if we conjoin externalism with an
anti-contextualist view, but one could be externalist without being anti-
contextualist. As for the option to change speaker-meanings, we found
no good reason to deny its feasibility. The only route would be to
develop an argument based on externalism about thought content, but
we found reason to doubt the cogency of that approach. And then,
even if conceptual engineers could not change what speakers mean by
their use of an expression in an existing language, they could still construct
new languages and convince people to speak them. Rejecting the latter
option requires adopting a dismissive view about the possibility of fine-
grained languages or of constructing languages, but we have not seen
any good reasons for taking such views.
I make no claim to have reviewed every consideration that bears upon
the feasibility and worth of the implementation options I have discussed.
Rather, I hope to have shown that a whole lot more needs to be argued,
including arguments for what seem to be unattractive views, if one wants
to maintain that conceptual engineers are engaged in a futile project.
Pending those arguments, we can conclude that conceptual engineers
face no more of an implementation problem than thinkers who engage
in the familiar project of trying to change what people believe.
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